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ABSTRACT
The nineteenth-century experiences of yellow fever epidemics in New Orleans and Norfolk present historical parallels for how those cities, and others, are experiencing existential threats from climate change and
sea level rise in the twenty-first century. In particular, the nineteenth-century ‘‘sanitary reform’’ movement
can be interpreted as a model for challenges facing twenty-first-century ‘‘climate resilience’’ initiatives, including denialism and political obfuscation of scientific debates as well as tensions between short-term profit
and the cost of long-term infrastructure investments and between individualism and communitarianism. The
history of sanitary reform suggests that, at least in the United States, climate resilience initiatives will advance
largely on a regional basis through extended local debates around these and other challenges until resilient
infrastructure and practices are taken for granted, much as sanitary waterworks and sewers are today.

1. A tale of two cities
New Orleans, Louisiana, and Norfolk, Virginia, both
low-lying port cities with centuries-long histories, often
are cited among U.S. cities that are most vulnerable to
sea level rise (Hallegatte et al. 2013). Both cities frequently are called out in studies that predict which urban
places may be abandoned to inundation by the end of
the twenty-first century (Strauss et al. 2015). This is not
the first time, though, that the two cities have been
equated as facing a common existential threat.
During the nineteenth century, New Orleans and
Norfolk were among coastal cities that experienced repeated outbreaks of yellow fever, resulting in large losses
of life. New Orleans had 36 significant outbreaks that
century while Norfolk had 8 (Patterson 1992). The greatest
losses in New Orleans occurred in 1853 (more than
9000 dead) and in Norfolk in 1855 (more than 3000 dead),
roughly 10% of the total population in each, the chronological proximity of which became the basis for contemporaneous comparisons of the two cities (Dowler 1859).
Like climate change in the present century, repetitive
nineteenth-century epidemics of yellow fever (as well as
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cholera, smallpox, and typhus) were perceived globally
as a long-term challenge to human civilization (Barton
1857). Efforts to eliminate such epidemics spanned
decades, lasted well into the twentieth century, and
continue to be waged in less developed parts of the
world. The primary nineteenth-century response to
those epidemics, ‘‘sanitary reform,’’ can be viewed as a
historical model for ‘‘resilience’’ responses to climate
change in the twenty-first century. Sanitary reform
resulted in the clean water and sanitation infrastructure that we take for granted today. While water and
sanitation were of concern prior to the nineteenth
century, the significant increase in urban population
densities in that century greatly exacerbated diseases,
resulting in hundreds of thousands of deaths, to
which unsanitary conditions contributed by heightening contagious communicability and disease vectors such as mosquitoes and lice.
Most historical accounts of sanitary reform treat it as
an inevitable progressive outcome, with little discussion
of its ups and downs (Leavitt 1980). At the time, however, the movement was a struggle that lasted more than
80 years due to unsettled science (both within and
outside the movement), competing philosophies of
individual rights and communal responsibilities, and
tensions between short-term private sector profits and
long-term public sector expenditures on sanitary infrastructure (Allen 2002).
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a. Scientific contestation
Sanitary reform began in the United Kingdom,
promoting a ‘‘miasmic’’ theory of disease that blamed
gases emanating from rotting organic matter as the causes.
Miasmic explanations spread to the United States and
became the initial basis for a social movement there as
well. Interestingly, scientific disagreements within the
movement between miasmic theorists and proponents
of the emerging germ theory of disease were quite bitter
(Richmond 1954). Those scientific disagreements were
used by opponents of investments in public sanitary
infrastructure to cast doubt on the need for reform.
For example, disagreements within the New Orleans
medical community as to the scientific causes of the
yellow fever epidemic of 1853 were used to justify
sanitary inaction, as noted in the New Orleans Bee in
1855 (Postell 1942):
After all our knowledge respecting yellow fever, its
causes and the means of preventing its appearance is
equally empirical and unsatisfactory. What can we really
know of the occult agencies which generate the disease,
when we see some scientific men proclaiming it indigenous, while others affirm that it is imported; one stoutly
maintaining that filth engenders it, while another strenuously argues the reverse; Medicus No. 1 confidently
asserting that quarantine is our only salvation, Medicus
No. 2 ridiculing with inextinguishable laughter the idea
that the disease is of foreign origin. The upshot of these
diametrically opposite conclusions is that we are wholly
ignorant of the causes of yellow fever.

Although miasmic theory and germ theory offered
conflicting explanations of the lived experience of yellow
fever in New Orleans, Norfolk, and elsewhere, most of
the sanitary recommendations made by proponents of
each—including centralized water, sewerage, and drainage
systems—were the same. Yet, even as late as the early
twentieth century, some physicians in New Orleans continued to cast doubt on the health benefits of a public
sewerage system (Behrman 1914):
In New Orleans the opinion was prevalent that the construction and operation of sewers would be a nuisance
and a menace to health, and this opinion was in a measure held be some physicians, who withheld their approval for several years as to the advisability of using
sewers, fearing obnoxious exhillations and the communication of contagious diseases.

As is the case today with climate change, the existence
of public disagreement about the causes of yellow fever
was equated with uncertainty about how to mitigate its
consequences. Denialism also was practiced in the midst
of observable outbreaks. At the height of the worst
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yellow fever epidemics, fearful of a loss of business,
newspapers in both New Orleans (in 1853) and Norfolk
(in 1855) minimized reports of illness and mortality
while asserting the ‘‘salubrious’’ nature of their respective climates (Bryant 1856; Carrigan 1959; McKiven
2007). With similar fears of business loss echoing, but an
acknowledgment of the scientific concensus that seas are
rising, both Norfolk and New Orleans are taking a different approach this time. Both are actively positioning
themselves as global centers of innovation for climate
resilience (Filer et al. 2017; Plyer et al. 2017).
While the twenty-first-century science of climate
change is more settled than was the nineteenth-century
science of infectious disease, resistance to both climate
resilience and sanitary reform takes advantage of the
evolving nature of scientific explanation of observed phenomena, which necessarily works through a process of
critically questioning and revising explanatory theories, to
inflate doubt as a rationale for maintaining the status quo.

b. Financial barriers
The cost of sanitary infrastructure—clean waterworks,
sewers, waste treatment facilities, and regular street
cleaning—also was used as an argument against reform,
most often through the comparison of short-term costs
to business as usual against long-term collective benefits
(Goldfield 1976). For example, in the immediate aftermath of the 1855 yellow fever epidemic, Norfolk was
granted approval by the Virginia General Assembly to
issue bonds for waterworks. However, resistance to
paying the property millage on the bonds as well as
national economic downturns delayed the realization of
those waterworks until 1873 (Burton 1877). During the
intervening years, citizens in favor of sanitary reform
organized parades, fireworks, and other public events to
counter resistance to the costs of public sanitation on the
part of segments of the business community. As the
Norfolk Post editorialized on 28 August 1865:
They have been talking about supplying their city with
water for the past century, and are farther now from the
adoption of any feasible plan than when the question was
first raised. They are fully impressed with the urgent necessity of having a constant and abundant supply of good
and wholesome water, but are appalled at the immensity of
the undertaking, at the exertion, labor and money it will
require; and so they postpone action in the matter year after
year, relying upon their stagnant cisterns, filled with dead
vermin and the filth of the gutters . . . It is a grievous sin—a
burden we can no longer afford to bear, and, with many
other dead weights, we must cast it into the sea of the past, if
we would ride safely in the harbor of the future.

Similar resistance to accepting short-term costs to
mitigate a long-term existential threat is echoed today in
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political debates about mitigating and adapting to climate change through reducing carbon emissions and
constructing public works, respectively. In 2016, for example, the Virginia General Assembly established the
Virginia Shoreline Resiliency Fund; however, this revolving loan fund has remained unfunded though the
issue is raised by citizens and members of the legislature
each year. Meanwhile municipalities such as Norfolk
estimate their infrastructure adaptation costs to be in the
billions with long-term benefits far exceeding the projected costs (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 2018).
Because the threats addressed are population level,
sanitary reform and climate resilience both necessarily
are premised on large-scale changes in human behavior
and major public infrastructure investments. As in the
case of nineteenth-century resistance to sanitary reform
(Ogle 1999), economic resistance to climate resilience is
based in part on a rhetoric of individualism that prioritizes short-term economic gains versus state-imposed
mandates that prioritize the long-term communal good.
Conflict between individualism and collectivism has
been identified as a central dynamic in environmental
decision-making generally (McCarty and Shrum 2001;
Morren and Grinstein 2016).

c. Top down, bottom up
‘‘Sanitary reform’’ and ‘‘climate resilience’’ are, at
once, scientifically based transnational movements in
response, respectively, to global epidemics and climate
change that know no political boundaries as well as
politically bounded local efforts to adapt to the groundlevel consequences of those phenomena. Although the
larger scientific and policy issues were debated on national and international stages, much of the work of
sanitary reform was done locally. In the course of that
nineteenth-century process, both New Orleans and
Norfolk necessarily developed more centralized municipal polities with more robust revenue sources. It is
likely that climate resilience will play out in a similar
manner (Foster et al. 2018), with attention already
being given to the role that urban entities will play in
‘‘climate change governance’’ (Bulkeley 2010).
New Orleans and Norfolk are examples of how resilience may become more a part of local public consciousness in the future. Citizens of the two cities already
encounter the consequences of climate change on a regular
basis. As a result of that shared lived experience, public
discourses in the two cities offer examples of how citizens
and their local representatives more directly grapple with
the trade-off of short-term costs and individualism with
long-term benefits and communal interests.
In New Orleans, a study of representative stakeholders
showed a consistent internalization of communal
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values—‘‘protecting and promoting healthy ecosystems and biodiversity’’ and ‘‘preserving New Orleans’
unique culture, traditions, and historically significant
neighborhoods’’—alongside more individually oriented
economic values with respect to climate risk management (Bessemer et al. 2017). In Hampton Roads (the
larger region composed of 17 localities of which Norfolk
is one), a variety of venues and sponsoring groups have
hosted what amounts to an ongoing discussion about
how to collaborate as a single regional community on
adaptations to sea level rise, across political boundaries
that traditionally have been resistant to working together (Considine and Steinhilber 2018). Moreover,
surveys of residents in Hampton Roads show a growing
belief that flooding in the region has increased over recent decades (Gainey and Vandecar-Burdin 2018).
Based on the history of sanitary reform, working out
barriers to communal interests and collaborations within
and between specific local contexts could be the critical
step in realizing national and international goals for climate resilience.

d. Lessons of sanitary reform
The trajectory of sanitary reform in New Orleans and
Norfolk may hold lessons for climate resilience. As
Melosi (2008) notes, the accomplishment of public
sanitation in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries depended on local combinations of a variety of
factors: emerging awareness due to scientific and educational efforts, emerging technologies for water and
sewer systems (including pumps and filtration), emerging means for public financing (including municipal
bonds and taxes), ongoing political dynamics that used
sanitary reform proposals as points of partisan contention, and the perception that a ‘‘modern’’ sanitary city
would be more attractive to business.
In both New Orleans and Norfolk, the progress of
sanitary reform played out through the lenses of local
political rivalries and the gradual emergence of centralized municipal services and tax bases to fund
those, but it also continued to have local political and
economic consequences long after sanitary infrastructure
was implemented.
Prior to 1908, New Orleans relied primarily on a privatized water system that delivered largely nonpotable
water to limited sections of the city, while a municipal
sewerage system was not constructed until 1903 (Behrman
1914). The performance of the private water system, along
with other aspects of city sanitation, was a key political
issue for over three decades as ‘‘reform’’ and ‘‘machine’’
political factions took turns running the city (Kolb 2000).
Ultimately, public water and sewerage systems using stateof-the-art technologies won out after continued outbreaks
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of yellow fever and waterborne diseases, but then were
constructed preferentially in segregated neighborhoods,
thereby increasing racial health disparities (Troesken 2001).
In Norfolk, financing and public acceptance were
continuing issues for first establishing and then expanding
and upgrading a public water system as well as the
construction of a sewerage infrastructure. Even after
those systems were put in place in the 1880s, many
households initially were reluctant to hook up to them
(Waring 1891). In the 1930s, as the practice of pumping
sewage into the Chesapeake Bay poisoned oyster beds
and contributed to water quality deterioration, the idea
of using public funds to construct the first Norfolk sewage treatment plant became a contentious political issue
between long-established political factions in the context of local implementation of federal New Deal programs (Lillis 2015).

e. Finding a safe harbor
Similar combinations of awareness, technology, financing methods, political dynamics, and municipal
modernity or progressiveness are evident in current
public discourse about resilience to climate change. As
in the case of sanitary reform, awareness is the first
hurdle to overcome, but developing effective technologies and practices along with viable public and private
financing methods and then navigating political dynamics that use the existential threat of climate change
to fuel partisanship can be even more challenging.
In reviewing the experiences of New Orleans and
Norfolk with respect to sanitary reform, the availability
of innovative financing models for water, sewerage, and
drainage infrastructure was a recurring challenge that
often took years to resolve. Arguably, work done now in
devising innovative ways to finance local resilience infrastructure projects as well as support ‘‘low carbon’’
changes in behavior could speed implementation once
the thresholds of public awareness and political contestation are overcome. Being able to present those financial approaches as reducing economic risks and
losses, and even as producing positive returns on investments, could help turn public and political sentiment
in favor of resilient choices. Investments in resilience
also can be presented as a way to attract visitors and
business to a locality, just as investments in public sanitation ultimately were portrayed.
In addition to being associated with changes in municipal financial instruments, the implementation of
sanitary reform also was associated with changes in
municipal polities, as both New Orleans and Norfolk
developed more centralized governments to fund, build,
and operate sanitary infrastructure. Changes in behavior
and infrastructure will require greater coordination

VOLUME 12

across municipal, county, and other local political subdivisions. Both Louisiana and Virginia have been
challenged by limited legal paths to enable such crossjurisdictional collaboration in response to the effects of
climate change (Lewis and Ernstson 2019; Considine
and Steinhilber 2018). Legislating those paths prospectively could accelerate the implementation of multilocality regional adaptation and mitigation strategies.
Once climate resilience is implemented on a large
scale, however, it may be seen retrospectively as having
been as inevitable a product of ‘‘human progress’’ as public
sanitation now is perceived. The institutionalization of
extensive adaptations (such as sanitary reform and climate resilience) in the fabric of everyday life necessarily
requires a cultural or value change to facilitate their
acceptance, thus casting each retrospectively as inevitable and unquestionable (Tarr et al. 1984). While evidence suggests that cultural turn now is well advanced in
New Orleans and Norfolk, an additional historical lesson
of sanitary reform is that such local shifts precede, by some
years, the formation of a national consensus.
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